PhyTAU¶
PhyTAU (Trusted Autonomy Unit) is a hardware trust module for robots. It runs the PhyTrace agent, collects telemetry from the robot's existing buses, signs PhyUDM events with a hardware-held key, and attests its own boot state to PhyCloud.
PhyTAU comes in two tiers:
- PhyTAU: a TPM 2.0 root of trust for commercial fleets.
- PhyTAU Enterprise: an enterprise-grade root of trust that extends trust to the whole robot and to the AI agents that control it (trusted agentic autonomy).
In active development
PhyTAU is not yet generally available. This page describes the target design. The status table shows what is implemented today. To join the pilot, contact business@phyware.io.
How it fits¶
graph LR
subgraph Robot
B[Robot brain] -- ROS 2 / DDS --> T[PhyTAU]
C[CAN bus] --> T
S[Serial / MAVLink] --> T
T --- K[(TPM 2.0)]
end
T -- signed PhyUDM batches + attestation --> P[PhyCloud]
P --> V[Verification result stored with each event] PhyTAU joins the robot as a trusted network peer and bus tap. It does not wire into every sensor and it sits in no actuation or safety path.
| Interface | Typical data |
|---|---|
| Ethernet (ROS 2 / DDS) | /odom, /scan, /battery_state, diagnostics, camera metadata |
| CAN bus | Motor controllers, BMS, wheel odometry, safety interlocks |
| UART / RS-232 / RS-485 | MAVLink, GPS, motor driver boards |
| USB | Cameras, IMUs, lidars, serial bridges |
What PhyCloud can verify¶
| Property | How |
|---|---|
| Which device sent the data | Asymmetric signature chained to a device certificate issued at enrollment, bound to the TPM endorsement key |
| The data was not altered | Signature over each batch root, covering events, provenance metadata and the attestation reference |
| Nothing is missing or replayed | Persistent TPM counter and boot epoch on every batch; PhyCloud tracks the high-water mark per device |
| The unit booted approved firmware | TPM quote over measured-boot PCRs, checked against reference values for each release |
| The unit is still present | Signed heartbeats; absence is surfaced as a gap |
What a signature does not prove¶
PhyTAU signs what it receives. If the robot's main computer is compromised and publishes plausible-looking data, PhyTAU will sign it and the signature will verify. Measured boot proves what software was loaded, not that it was never exploited afterwards.
A PhyTAU signature proves provenance and integrity, not truth. Later phases narrow this gap by attesting the robot brain and other components; they do not close it.
Roadmap¶
| Phase | Capability |
|---|---|
| 1 — Secure telemetry gateway | TPM-backed batch signing, enrollment, boot attestation, offline buffering |
| 2 — Robot-brain co-attestation | PhyTAU challenges the robot's main computer for a TPM quote; data from an unapproved state is signed and flagged |
| 3 — Robot-wide root of trust and trusted agentic autonomy (Enterprise) | Component identities, attested agents, models and policies, signed decision provenance, optional gating co-designed with the OEM safety case |
Status¶
| Capability | Status |
|---|---|
| Offline store-and-forward in the PhyTrace agents | Available |
PhyCloud hash chain and phyware cloud verify | Available (per tenant and per device) |
| Evidence lockers with Merkle roots | Available |
| HMAC event signing in the SDKs | Available for development only; not yet verified by PhyCloud |
| TPM-backed signing, device enrollment, attestation verification | In development |
| Replay / gap / heartbeat detection per device | In development |
| Phase 1 reference hardware (Jetson Orin Nano + TPM 2.0) | In development |